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The productivity slowdown in European countries is among the major stylised facts of the last two 
decades. Several explanations have been proposed: some focus on demand-side effects, working 
through Kaldor’s second law of economic growth (also known as Verdoorn’s law), others on sup-
ply-side effects determined by a misallocation of the factors of production, caused either by labour 
market reforms or by perverse effects of fi nancial integration (in Europe, related to the adoption of 
the euro). The latter explanation is put forward by some recent studies that stress how low inter-
est rates brought about by the monetary union may have lowered productivity by inducing capital 
misallocation. The aim of this paper is to investigate the robustness of the latter empirical fi ndings 
and to compare them with the alternative explanation offered by the post-Keynesian growth model, 
which instead emphasises the relation between foreign trade and productivity, along lines that go 
back to Adam Smith. To do so, we use a panel of industry-level data extracted from the EU KLEMS 
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1. INTRODUCTION
After the Lehman shock on September 15, 2008, the world economy, its growth 
already affected by the subprime mortgage crisis that started in December 2007, 
entered in its worst recession since World War II. The crisis was particularly se-
vere in the euro area, where the real growth rate fell to –4.5% in 2009 (IMF 2016). 
Interestingly enough, the worst affected country among the four biggest euro area 
members (henceforth, EA4) was Germany (–5.6%), followed by Italy (–5.5%), 
Spain (–3.6%), and France (–2.9%). Euro area performance after the shock was 
also disappointing. While US GDP exceeded its pre-crisis level in 2011, two years 
after the shock, it took until 2015 (six years) for the whole euro area to return to 
its pre-crisis GDP level, and some euro area countries, including Italy and Spain, 
have not yet managed to recover. This poor performance can at least partly be ex-
plained by a remarkable stylised fact: since the mid-1990s, productivity in some 
major European countries has experienced a sudden slowdown.
An interesting pattern is illustrated in Figure 1, where only EA4 countries are 
considered. While average labour productivity kept growing at a relatively steady 
pace until the crisis in the two northern “champions” (France and Germany), the 
productivity index flattens somewhere in the biennium 1995–1997 in the two 
southern countries (Italy and Spain) and its growth remains subdued, not recover-
ing at all in Italy (Mas et al. 2008).
The “sudden stop” in productivity experienced by countries like Italy and 
Spain affected their overall economic performance and, owing to their size, the 
performance of the euro area as a whole. As far as Italy is concerned, Daveri 
– Jona-Lasinio (2005) expected the relative GDP decline to herald an absolute 
GDP decline, which materialised in 2009. Moreover, the asymmetry of this sud-
den stop fostered the external imbalances now unanimously recognised as the 
main cause of the euro area crisis.1 The negative effect of the productivity slow-
down on southern countries’ competitiveness was reinforced by the adoption of 
an overvalued currency.2 The latter fostered external imbalances through a real 
channel (the real effective exchange rate appreciation of the southern countries 
1  Baldwin – Giavazzi (2015) propose their “new consensus” view, according to which the euro 
area crisis was caused by intra-area external imbalances, and therefore was “not a public-debt 
crisis”. However, this analysis is not original. For instance, the ECB has stressed the crucial 
role of private external debt in the financial crisis since ECB (2011). Moreover, post-Keyne-
sian economists immediately dismissed the “public debt” narrative of the crisis (e.g. Frenkel 
– Rapetti 2009; Cesaratto – Stirati 2010), at the same time in which mainstream economists 
used it to support the neoliberal “structural reforms” agenda.
2  On the real effective exchange rate misalignment within the euro area, see, e.g., Coudert et al. 
(2013) or El-Shagi et al. (2016).
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increased their net imports), and a financial channel (the low-interest rate envi-
ronment created by the single currency made it easier to refinance increasingly 
large external deficits). This perverse loop of slowing productivity, falling com-
petitiveness, increasing capital inflows, increasing inflation, and further falling 
competitiveness, combined with “credibility” bought by entering the euro (mostly 
determined by the abolition of exchange rate risk on intra-euro area cross-border 
lending), explains the huge accumulation of external imbalances that according 
to ECB (2011) were the main trigger of the euro area crisis.
The productivity slowdown has promoted much research, reviewed briefly in 
the first section of this paper. Most explanations rest on the neoclassical frame-
work, which stresses the role of the supply side, indicating factor misallocation 
as a major source of productivity slowdown. In particular, Gopinath et al. (2015) 
argue that increased financial integration promoted by the euro could misallocate 
capital inflows towards firms with a higher net worth, but not necessarily with 
a higher productivity, thereby causing a fall in the average productivity of the 
economy. A similar perverse effect of financial integration, at a more aggregate 
level, is to divert resources from the tradable sector to the relatively more unpro-
ductive non-tradable sector (Reis 2013). In both cases, the testable implications 
at the macro level are that a fall in real interest rates will bring about an increase 
Figure 1. Average productivity of labour (GDP per hour worked, index: 1970 = 100) in the four 
largest euro area economies 
Source: OECD Statistics (data extracted on September 17, 2016).
116 ALBERTO BAGNAI – CHRISTIAN ALEXANDER MONGEAU OSPINA
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
in the dispersion of the return to capital across firms, and a fall in the rate of pro-
ductivity growth.3 
Alternative explanations of the southern euro area productivity slowdown that 
consider the demand side have only recently been proposed. Bagnai (2016) ex-
plains Italy’s decline using the post-Keynesian growth model, built along the 
lines set forth by Kaldor (1970) and Dixon – Thirlwall (1975). In the post-Key-
nesian framework, the slowdown in Italian productivity can be interpreted as 
the consequence of a tightening of the balance-of-payments constraint (Thirl-
wall 1979), feeding back through Verdoorn’s (1949) law on productivity growth, 
along the lines set out in Thirlwall (2002). The testable implication at the macro 
level is that by reducing foreign demand for domestic goods, an increase in the 
rate of exchange rate appreciation will bring about a fall in the growth rate of 
productivity.
The purpose of this paper is to compare these two recent competing explana-
tions of the southern euro area productivity slowdown: the post-Keynesian one, 
which stresses the circular and cumulative causation process between demand 
conditions and productivity and where exchange rate plays a major role, and the 
neoclassical one, which focuses on factor misallocation at the micro level and 
where the real interest rate is the main explanatory variable at the macro level. 
To do so, we build on the recent work of Cette et al. (2016) who find a strongly 
significant positive relation between the rate of productivity growth and the real 
rate of interest in a panel of industry-level data extracted from the EU KLEMS 
database.4 We first investigate the robustness of their findings, using their own 
empirical specification, by analysing the sensitivity of the results to the choice of 
countries included in the sample. The neoclassical hypothesis is then compared 
directly with the post-Keynesian one by augmenting the estimated equation with 
the rate of change of the nominal effective exchange rate. To overcome some 
shortcomings of Cette et al.’s (2016) estimation methodology, we replicate the 
analysis by panel cointegration techniques.
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section briefly surveys the 
literature on the southern European productivity slowdown, highlights the main 
features of the competing models, and reviews the available empirical evidence. 
Section 3 presents the data and the econometric estimation techniques. Section 4 
presents the results. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
3  Calligaris et al. (2016) describe the increased dispersion in the value of total factor productiv-
ity in a micro-level panel of Italian firms; Cette et al. (2016) explore the relation between the 
real interest rate and the rate of growth of productivity in a panel of industry-level data.
4  The EU KLEMS database contains various economic variables (e.g. gross value added, labour 
and total factor productivity, labour and capital compensation) at industry level for European 
Union member countries ( http://www.euklems.net/). 
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2. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRE-GREAT RECESSION 
PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN: A SURVEY OF THEORY AND EVIDENCE
2.1. Neoclassical explanations
Mainstream explanations of the productivity slowdown are based on the neoclas-
sical growth model, which considers economic growth an intrinsically supply-
side phenomenon. In this framework, a fall in productivity may be caused by 
misallocation of factors of production determined by frictions that hinder smooth 
working of the market allocation mechanism. Two strands in this literature deal 
with the misallocation of labour and capital, respectively. 
The role of the misallocation of labour has been stressed since Gordon – 
Dew-Becker (2008), who focus on the impact of European labour market re-
forms on labour productivity. The increased “flexibility” and lower wage growth 
achieved through these reforms may encourage entrepreneurs to adopt relatively 
more labour-intensive techniques. The positive effect of flexibility in reduc-
ing unemployment could therefore come at the expense of labour productivity, 
as observed for example by Enflo (2010). Using a micro level panel of Italian 
firms, Daveri – Parisi (2010) investigated the fall in labour productivity occur-
ring between 2001 and 2003, finding support for this hypothesis: labour produc-
tivity appears to be lower in firms with a higher share of part-time or temporary 
workers. On the basis of this evidence, they explain the productivity slowdown 
in terms of the labour market reforms implemented since 1997 (Sciulli 2006; 
Barbieri – Scherer 2009).
The second strand of the mainstream literature focuses on capital misalloca-
tion, building on the framework established by Hsieh – Klenow (2009), where 
misallocations are detected at the level of firms by looking at the dispersion in 
revenue productivity (defined as the product of physical productivity and the 
firm’s output price), since revenue productivity should be equated across firms in 
the absence of market distortions. According to Gopinath et al. (2015), the pro-
ductivity slowdown in southern euro area countries can be explained by capital 
inflows favoured by the decline in real interest rates after the adoption of the euro. 
Since these inflows were diverted towards firms with a higher net worth, which 
are not necessarily more productive, they determined capital misallocation, sig-
nalled by increased dispersion in revenue productivity, producing a fall in average 
total factor productivity. While in their theoretical model these effects are seen 
as “transitional dynamics” towards a new equilibrium, the aggregate impulse re-
sponse function of their model displays a persistent slowdown in the rate of total 
factor productivity growth in response to a permanent fall in the real interest rate, 
such as that experienced by euro area countries in the 1990s. It is worth noting 
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that Gopinath et al. (2015) relate the fall in real interest rate, and hence in pro-
ductivity, to the onset of the single currency; moreover, they find no evidence of 
misallocation effects in northern countries such as France, Germany, and Norway, 
thereby establishing an asymmetry between northern and southern countries.
Calligaris et al. (2016) apply Hsieh – Klenow’s (2009) methodology to a large 
firm-level dataset of Italian firms. Their results confirm the findings of Gopinath 
et al. (2015). In particular, they find that dispersion in marginal revenue produc-
tivity has significantly increased since the mid-1990s and that “within” disper-
sion is larger than “between” dispersion (ruling out misallocation across sectors 
or geographical areas as a major source of inefficiencies, as assumed by previous 
studies such as Faini – Sapir 2005). Moreover, they use panel regressions to test 
the relevance of a number of possible “markers” for misallocation and productiv-
ity (the markers consider among other factors the firm’s size, credit constraints, 
workforce composition, and cronyism). However, they do not consider the effect 
of real interest rates on misallocation and dismiss any impact of the euro on the 
basis of the statistical significance of euro dummy variables (equal to one from 
1999 onwards).
Cette et al. (2016) focus on the impact of the real interest rate on TFP and 
labour productivity growth. They use a panel consisting of 18 sectors observed 
in 13 countries on a sample ranging from 1995 to 2008. Their results confirm 
Gopinath et al.’s (2015) findings of a positive relation between the real interest 
rate and productivity growth (however measured), which implies that the fall in 
real interest rate following adoption of the euro had a detrimental effect on aggre-
gate productivity. Interestingly, although the theoretical and empirical results of 
Gopinath et al. (2015) suggest that no productivity slowdown was experienced in 
northern countries, Cette et al. (2016) include countries in the north and south of 
the euro area in the same panel, together with other major OECD countries. The 
decision to rule out any possible asymmetry between net creditor and net debtor 
countries by conflating them in the same panel, without taking into account their 
possible heterogeneity, casts some doubt on the robustness of their results and 
prompts further investigation.
2.2. Post-Keynesian explanations
Kaldor’s (1966) second law of economic growth, also known as Verdoorn’s 
(1949) law, establishes a positive relation between aggregate demand and pro-
ductivity, due to the presence of dynamic increasing returns to scale (Thirlwall 
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1983).5 The law is a building block of the post-Keynesian growth model, stem-
ming from Kaldor (1970) and Dixon – Thirlwall (1975).6 An interesting impli-
cation of the model is that the rate of the change of productivity, q̇t is affected, 
among other things, by the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, ė t. The 
causal chain goes as follows: a sustained drop (increase) in ė t causes a sustained 
increase (drop) in the growth of exports and hence in the rate of growth of ag-
gregate demand via the Hicks (1950) supermultiplier. Through Kaldor’s second 
law, the increase (drop) in the rate of the growth of aggregate demand causes an 
increase (drop) in the rate of growth of labour productivity, which feeds back to 
competitiveness and hence exports, setting up a virtuous (vicious) circular and 
cumulative growth process.
This feature of the post-Keynesian growth model is particularly relevant for our 
analysis. As shown in Figure 1, a striking feature of labour productivity in south-
ern countries is that it flattens around 1997. This is precisely the year in which 
the currencies of the euro area candidate countries were forced to observe the 
“normal fluctuation margins” of the European Monetary System in order to meet 
the convergence criterion established by article 109j of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which basically meant that the candidate currencies were pegged to the European 
Currency Unit (ECU). Figure 2 shows that the observance of this convergence 
criterion resulted in a major structural break, putting to an end for more than 
two decades persistent nominal depreciation in southern countries and persistent 
nominal revaluation in some northern countries. In terms of the post-Keynesian 
model, in a country like Italy this resulted in a large positive shock to ė t (possibly 
with adverse consequences on q̇t), while in a country like Germany the shock was 
large and negative (Table 1).7
It is worth noting at this stage that the post-Keynesian model seems to ac-
count better for the observed divergence in labour productivity than the neoclas-
sical one. As a matter of fact, since real interest rates have fallen everywhere in 
the euro area, their behaviour cannot really account for the diverging patterns of 
productivity between northern and southern countries shown in Figure 1. On the 
other hand, this diverging pattern is consistent with the persistent shocks to the 
rate of change of nominal exchange rates reported in Table 1. 
5  Kaldorʼs second law follows a line of argument that can be traced back to Chapter 3 (“That the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market”) of Book 1 in Smith (1776).
6 The structure of the model is set out in Appendix A, following Thirlwall (2002).
7  As far as Italy is concerned, Bagnai (2016) shows that this major shock (to an almost 5-point 
increase) lowered the average productivity growth rate.
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. The data
The previous discussion boils down to a simple empirical question: which of 
the following two variables provides a better explanation of the productivity 
trends: the real interest rate (as in the neoclassical “misallocation” hypothe-
sis) or the nominal (effective) exchange rate (as in the post-Keynesian growth 
model)? In order to answer this question, we started with the database provided 
by Cette et al. (2016), which can be found in the supplementary material for 
Figure 2. The nominal effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100) 
in the four largest euro area economies 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer.htm.
Table 1. Average rate of change of nominal effective exchange rate in EA4 countries, %
France Germany Italy Spain
1970–1996 –0.3 3.2 –4.5 –2.6
1997–2014 0.0 –0.1 0.1 –0.2
increase 0.3 –3.3 4.6 2.4
Source: Bank of International Settlements, http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer.htm.
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their article.8 The dataset covers 13 countries: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, and United States, and provides two productivity measures (labour 
productivity, measured as value added per worker, and total factor productivity) 
for 18 sectors.9
Along with this productivity data, the dataset provides real interest rate se-
ries measured as 10-year government interest rates (original source: Datastream), 
deflated by the country’s consumer price index. We supplemented this database 
with the annual nominal effective exchange rate from the Bank of International 
Settlements (narrow definition).10
3.2. The estimated equations
As a first step, we replicated the results reported by Cette et al. (2016) in their 
Table 1, estimating the following equation: 
  (1)
where qi,c,t is the average labour productivity index in industry i (i = 1, …, 18) and 
country c (c = 1, …, 13) at time t (t = 1995, …, 2008), rc,t is the real interest rate 
in country c at time t, L is the lag operator, αi,c is a country/sector fixed effect, γs 
and δs are parameters (s = 1, 2), and εi,c,t is a well-behaved residual.11
8  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.03.012. We used the Stata dataset available in the 
Table_1_CFM_replication_progs.zip file. 
9  For the European countries, the original data source for the productivity measures is the EU 
KLEMS database (ISIC Rev. 4). Data sources for the other countries are indicated in Cette et 
al. (2016). The 18 sectors are: Food products, beverages and tobacco; Textiles, textile prod-
ucts, leather and footwear; Wood and products of wood and cork; Pulp, paper, paper products, 
printing and publishing; Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel; Other non-metallic minerals; Ba-
sic metals and fabricated metal; Machinery, n.e.c.; Electrical and optical equipment; Transport 
equipment; Manufacturing n.e.c., recycling; Electricity, gas and water supply; Construction; 
Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; Accommodation and 
food service activities; Transport and storage, post and telecommunications; Financial and 
insurance activities; Real estate activities.
10  http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer.htm (last accessed: May 1, 2016); the annual series was ob-
tained by taking yearly averages of the monthly data.
11  Cette et al. (2016) present the results for average labour productivity (lpi,c,t) and total factor 
productivity (tfpi,c,t). The pattern of their results does not change significantly when tfp is 
utilised. However, since the measurement of tfp involves some degree of arbitrariness and is 
subject to the Cambridge capital controversy (see, e.g., Kurz 2013) because it requires estima-
tion of a neoclassical aggregate production function, we decided to use lp as our productivity 
measure.
2
1 2 , , , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , ,(1 ) log( )i c t i c c t c t i c tL L q r r             
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Some remarks on the peculiar functional form of Equation (1) are needed.12 
In the terminology of Hendry et al. (1984), Equation (1) is the “leading indica-
tor” specification of a second order autoregressive-distributed lag equation, or 
AD(2,2). Considering only lagged values of the explanatory variable, the model 
implicitly assumes that the interest rate has no contemporaneous impact on pro-
ductivity. This assumption, which could prove restrictive owing to the yearly 
frequency of the data, is adopted without theoretical or empirical justification. 
The inclusion of both the lagged explanatory variable and its first differences cor-
responds to the following reparameterisation of a distributed lag model: 
  
Therefore, in Equation (1), δ1 = β1 + β2, and δ2 = −β2. This reparameterisation 
presents the advantage of allowing the direct estimation of the sum of the distrib-
uted lag and of the associated standard error. However, the claim by Cette et al. 
(2016, note 28) that coefficient δ1 in Equation (1) represents the “total effect” of 
rc,t on ∆log(qi,c,t) is wrong, because the total multiplier of a dynamic model must 
consider the autoregressive component. As a consequence, all the total effects 
reported in Table 1 of Cette et al. (2016) need to be recalculated as shown in Ap-
pendix B, along with their standard errors, which now refer to a nonlinear func-
tion of regression coefficients. The latter calculations can be performed using the 
Delta method (Efron – Tibshirani 1986).13 
In order to compare the neoclassical and post-Keynesian hypotheses, we aug-
ment Equation (1) with a measure of the nominal effective exchange rate varia-
tion as follows:
  (2)
where neerc,t is the nominal effective exchange rate index in country c at time t. 
We did not perform any specification search and just added the new explanatory 
variable symmetrically to the existing one. We expect neerc,t to enter the equation 
with a negative sign, and possibly neutralise the statistical significance of the real 
interest rate.
12  Cette et al. (2016) do not specify the actual functional form of their estimated equation. How-
ever, this can easily be reconstructed from their Stata codes.
13 See also Papke – Wooldridge (2005) for an application in the context of a dynamic panel.
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From a methodological point of view, Equations (1) and (2) have a number of 
shortcomings: the order of the lags is chosen arbitrarily; the LSDV estimation 
of a dynamic panel model is known to be subject to considerable bias;14 the real 
interest rate is often found in empirical studies to be an I(1) variable, which im-
plies that a model relating it to the first differences of another I(1) variable such 
as productivity may result in an unbalanced regression; finally, by differencing 
the dependent variable, any information on its long-run behaviour is filtered out. 
Since productivity is an intrinsically long-run phenomenon and the analysis re-
volves around the estimation of the “total effect” of the interest rate (i.e. of the 
total multiplier of the model), a more convenient modelling choice would be 
to estimate the total multipliers directly through cointegrating panel regression, 
rather than inferring it from a nonlinear function of (possibly) biased short-run 
coefficients.
Taking stock of these considerations, we estimated a panel cointegrating rela-
tion by means of Pedroni’s (1999, Eq. 1) pooled FMOLS estimator, using the 
following specification: 
  (3)
where the variables are defined as before, αi,c is an industry-country fixed effect 
and t is a deterministic trend. Equation (3) allows an individual trend to be in-
cluded in every individual regression, thereby accounting for idiosyncratic exog-
enous factors that may affect productivity in industries in the different countries 
(such as industry- and country-specific patterns of technological progress). The 
variables included in Equation (3) were tested for a unit root through the usual 
battery of panel unit root tests (Levin et al. 2002; Im et al. 2003; Fisher χ2 statis-
tics constructed using ADF and PP statistics of individual equations, see Maddala 
– Wu 1999).15 The existence of a cointegrating relation was tested using the group 
mean cointegration tests based on PP and ADF statistics of individual equations 
(considering a deterministic trend in the individual equations).
14  The bias in the Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimator of a dynamic panel model 
was studied by Nickell (1981). Although this bias is known to vanish asymptotically, the 
Monte Carlo analysis by Judson – Owen (1997) shows that it can be sizeable in samples where 
T<20.
15  The order of lags was determined automatically on the basis of the Schwarz information cri-
terion. A deterministic trend was included when the time series displayed trending behaviour 
(productivity, nominal effective exchange rate).
, , , , 1, , , 2, , , , ,log ( ) log ( )i c t i c i c i c c t i c c t i c tq t r neer        
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4. RESULTS
4.1. The robustness of the neoclassical hypothesis
Table 2 replicates the results of Cette et al. (2016) on the size and significance of 
the neoclassical “misallocation effect”, providing a full account of the equation 
estimates and recalculating the total effect and associated standard errors along 
the lines set out in Appendix B. All in all, the pattern of the results is robust with 
respect to this modification. Since the coefficients of the lagged dependent vari-
able are mostly negative, the correct total multiplier θ(1) is consistently lower 
than the sum of the distributed lag β(1) = β1+ β2 (labelled as “total effect” by Cette 
et al. 2016). However, this does not affect the statistical significance of the multi-
plier, and it is still true that the “total effect”, however measured, is larger for the 
EA4 subset (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) than for the whole sample.
Since the theoretical studies on which this empirical analysis rests propose 
capital misallocation as an explanation of productivity slowdown in southern 
euro area countries (not in the whole euro area or in OECD countries), it makes 
sense to check whether the “capital misallocation” explanation is actually robust 
when applied to the core euro area countries (instead of a panel including pe-
ripheral countries, i.e. the countries for which the hypothesis is advanced in the 
literature).
Table 2. Re-estimating the model of Cette et al. (2016)
13 countries: 3055 observations
All sectors Manufacturing Services
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
γ1 0.00 0.97 –0.02 0.45 0.05 0.26
γ2 –0.15 0.00 –0.17 0.00 –0.14 0.00
δ1 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.05 0.25 0.00
δ2 –0.44 0.00 –0.52 0.00 –0.40 0.01
θ(1) 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.23 0.00
R2 0.43 0.43 0.33
Euro area 4: 976 observations
γ1 0.02 0.46 0.00 0.93 0.11 0.13
γ2 –0.14 0.00 –0.18 0.00 0.09 0.21
δ1 0.27 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.19 0.15
δ2 –0.46 0.01 –0.62 0.01 –0.12 0.60
θ(1) 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.23 0.13
R2 0.51 0.53 0.40
Note: Dependent variable: Rate of change of labour productivity.
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Table 3 shows the results of several robustness checks only in terms of the size 
and significance of the total multiplier of the equations. We first replicated the 
estimates with the panel of the seven euro area countries in the sample (Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Spain). The results are 
reported in the first row of Table 3 and do not differ greatly from the EA4 results 
in the lower panel of Table 2, with the possible exception of the “Manufactur-
ing” sectors, where the total multiplier θ(1) falls from 0.33 to 0.24, but remains 
strongly significant. We then split this sample into five “core” countries (Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany and The Netherlands) and two “peripheral” countries 
(Italy and Spain). When the euro area core and periphery are analysed separately, 
the results change dramatically. In the core, the total multiplier falls further (the 
most evident fall is in the “Services” sectors, where it drops from 0.23 to 0.06), 
losing statistical significance (Table 3, second row). On the other hand, despite 
the relatively limited number of observations (484 for the “All sectors” panel), 
the size of the effect in the periphery is robust to changes (it moves from 0.22 
to 0.23 in the “All sectors” panel) and its statistical significance is unchanged or 
improves, as in the “Services” sectors (Table 3, third row).
This result calls for further investigation. Since as recalled in the Introduc-
tion, Italy is a negative outlier in terms of economic performance, one may wish 
to verify whether its exclusion from the panel affects the statistical significance 
of the results. The outcomes of this further analysis are shown in the fourth row 
of Table 3, and the answer is positive: once Italy is excluded from the sample, 
the size and statistical significance of the total multiplier are both lost. For in-
stance, in the “All sectors” panel, the total multiplier falls from 0.22 in the euro 
area sample – first row – to 0.15, and becomes statistically insignificant at the 
5% level. Curiously, the same does not occur when Spain is excluded from the 
sample (Table 3, fifth row). In this case, the size and significance of the total mul-
tiplier both improve, except in the “Services” sector. Conversely, by restricting 
the analysis to Italy (Table 3, sixth row), the total multipliers become larger and 
Table 3. Core-periphery asymmetries in the model estimates
All sectors Manufacturing Services
7 euro area countries 0.22 (0.00) 0.24 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01)
5 core euro area countries 0.18 (0.06) 0.17 (0.20) 0.06 (0.58)
2 peripheral euro area countries 0.23 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 0.47 (0.00)
Euro area without Italy 0.15 (0.06) 0.17 (0.10) 0.13 (0.13)
Euro area without Spain 0.27 (0.00) 0.27 (0.01) 0.20 (0.06)
Italy 0.48 (0.00) 0.43 (0.00) 0.70 (0.04)
Spain 0.05 (0.66) 0.13 (0.33) 0.34 (0.00)
Notes: Estimates of the total multiplier θ(1); p-values are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable: Rate of 
change of labour productivity.
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statistically more significant (in the “Manufacturing” sector the total multiplier 
goes from 0.24 in the euro area sample – first row – to 0.43 for Italy). On the other 
hand, if one considers Spain alone (Table 3, last row), the total multiplier in the 
“All sectors” specification drops to 0.05, with a p-value of 0.66, and the misallo-
cation effect only seems to prevail in the “Services” sector, with a total multiplier 
of 0.34, significant at the 1% level.
The results so far seem to confirm the validity of the neoclassical hypothesis: 
there seems to be evidence of capital misallocation only in southern countries, 
as suggested by neoclassical theoretical studies. At the same time, these results 
disprove the validity of the empirical study carried out by Cette et al. (2016), 
because the overall significance of their estimates depends on conflating very 
heterogeneous countries in the same panel, and disappears once Italy is removed 
from the panel.
4.2. Assessing the role of the nominal exchange rate: the case of Italy
The previous check shows that the only country featuring distinct evidence of 
capital misallocation effects is Italy. It therefore makes sense to check the robust-
ness of this evidence by controlling the estimates for the post-Keynesian effect. 
To do so, we augmented the model with the rate of change of the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate. 
Table 4 shows the results of estimation of Equation (2) for Italy. Besides the 
symbols already defined, ω(1) is the total multiplier of the nominal effective ex-
change rate variation: 1 1 2(1) (1 )      . The estimates should be compared 
with those reported in the sixth row of Table 3. When the nominal exchange rate 
enters the picture, the coefficient of the real interest rate drops in size, and be-
comes statistically insignificant. Conversely, as envisaged by the post-Keynesian 
growth model, the rate of change of the nominal effective exchange rate has a 
negative impact on productivity, which is significant at the 10% level both in the 
manufacturing sector and in the whole economy.
While these results cast some doubt on the statistical robustness of the capital 
misallocation effect, they do not provide strong evidence of a post-Keynesian 
effect either. However, we must recognise that the specification of Equations (1) 
and (2) contains a number of oddities that might affect the significance of the 
estimates. Besides the four already mentioned in the methodological section (ar-
bitrary choice of lag length; bias in LSDV estimates of dynamic panels; possibly 
unbalanced equation; loss of long-run information on productivity determined by 
adopting a first-differences filter), another feature of these estimates is particu-
larly striking: the study of Cette et al. (2016) purports to explain a break in the 
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productivity trend occurring in the mid-1990s, but it mostly uses data from the 
post-break period (1995–2008), with little or no statistical information from the 
previous regime. One may legitimately wonder whether the data has enough vari-
ance to allow research into the causes of this structural change.
In order to address this and the other methodological issues outlined above, let 
us proceed to the panel cointegration estimates of the relation between productiv-
ity and the rates of interest and change. 
4.3. Panel cointegration estimates
In order to examine the turning point in southern countries’ productivity trend, 
we extended the sample back to 1988, thereby considering roughly a decade of 
data before and a decade after the date of the observed productivity slowdown. 
Moreover, since the theoretical explanations stress asymmetry between the north-
ern (or “core”) and the southern (or “peripheral”) countries of the euro area, we 
restricted the panel cointegration analysis to the EA4 subset of countries, which 
includes two core countries (France and Germany) and two peripheral countries 
(Italy and Spain). 
The panel cointegration approach has a number of distinct advantages in this 
case: (1) As mentioned above, it allows direct estimation of the parameters of 
interest (total multipliers). (2) Since the estimated long-run regression is static, 
there is no need to specify an arbitrary number of lags in the estimated equation. 
(3) The superconsistency of the cointegrating estimators prevails over any pos-
sible simultaneity bias, and the use of Fully Modified OLS estimators accom-
modates the possibility of endogeneity. (4) The estimator adopted takes hetero-
Table 4. Augmenting the model with the nominal effective exchange rate: Italy
All sectors Manufacturing Services
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
γ1 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.37
γ2 –0.28 0.00 –0.32 0.00 0.00 0.99
δ1 0.30 0.10 0.14 0.51 0.65 0.13
δ2 –1.02 0.00 –1.69 0.00 0.75 0.34
μ1 –0.23 0.01 –0.34 0.00 0.11 0.57
μ2 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.80
θ(1) 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.79 0.44
ω(1) –0.20 0.07 –0.28 0.08 0.14 0.25
R2 0.58 0.65 0.35
Note: Dependent variable: Rate of change of labour productivity.
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geneity among individuals into account, which in the present case seems quite 
relevant.
Table 5 shows the results of the panel unit root tests. The null hypothesis of 
a unit root in the data is never rejected, with the possible exception of the LLC 
test on productivity. It should be stressed, however, that this test rests on the 
particularly restrictive assumption that each individual has the same autoregres-
sive coefficient under the alternative hypothesis. The tests allowing for individual 
heterogeneity (IPS, ADF, PP) consistently fail to reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root even for labour productivity. We can therefore safely conclude that all 
the series have a unit root.16
Table 6 shows the cointegration estimates of Equation (3) performed using 
Pedroni’s (2000) FMOLS estimator. The group-PP and group-ADF cointegra-
tion tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, which implies 
that the variables are related by a meaningful long-run relationship. The results 
16  As recalled above, this suggests that Equations (1) and (2) may be misspecified, because they 
relate a I(0) variable (the first differences of an I(1) variable, namely, the log of productivity) 
to a I(1) variable (the real interest rate), thereby resulting in an unbalanced regression.
Table 5. Results of the panel unit root tests in the EA4 sample
All sectors Manufacturing Services
log(qi,c,t)
LLC 0.00 0.01 0.22
IPS 0.12 0.09 0.76
ADF 0.08 0.05 0.74
PP 0.91 0.63 0.99
rc,t
LLC 0.39 0.39 0.39
IPS 0.92 0.92 0.92
ADF 0.92 0.92 0.92
PP 0.96 0.96 0.96
log(neerc,t)
LLC 0.40 0.40 0.40
IPS 0.93 0.93 0.93
ADF 0.83 0.83 0.83
PP 0.84 0.84 0.84
Notes: The table reports the p-values of the following panel unit root tests: the  statistics of Levin et al. (2002), 
LLC; the Wtbar statistics of Im et al. (2003), IPS; the Fisher pλ test of Maddala – Wu (1999) constructed with the 
individual equation ADF statistics, ADF; and the pλ test constructed using PP statistics, PP. The lag length was 
selected automatically using the Schwarz Information Criterion. The tests on log(qi,c,t) and log(neerc,t) include 
an individual deterministic trend. A p-value below α indicates that the unit root null hypothesis is rejected at the 
α×100 level. Since the same real interest rate and nominal effective exchange rate apply to every industry, the 
results of their panel unit root tests do not change with the composition of the panel.
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show a consistent pattern: firstly, the coefficient of real interest rate changes its 
sign from positive to negative and becomes statistically insignificant (more pre-
cisely: it is marginally significant at the 10% level only in the Manufacturing 
sector); secondly, the elasticity of productivity to the nominal effective exchange 
rate has the expected negative sign and is strongly significant. These results hint 
at a picture completely different from that suggested by the misallocation hy-
pothesis, one where persistent deviations of productivity from its deterministic 
trend (representing any exogenous force driving productivity) are explained by 
the stochastic trend in the nominal effective exchange rate, possibly with a nega-
tive impact of the real interest rate at least in the manufacturing sector. The latter 
effect is consistent with the standard assumption that a fall in real interest rates 
fosters investment, and that investment may contribute to the quality of the exist-
ing capital stock and hence to the productivity of labour. The estimates in Table 6 
therefore make any “counterintuitive” explanation of the negative effects of low 
interest rates completely unnecessary, while pointing out the intuitive dangers of 
an overvalued exchange rate for a country exporting manufactured goods.
Interestingly enough, unlike the evidence on the neoclassical “misallocation” 
effect, the results in Table 6 are robust to the exclusion of Italy from the sample. 
The bottom panel of the table replicates the estimations after excluding Italy. 
While the elasticities are generally smaller, the pattern of the results is similar: 
all coefficients are negative and those of the real interest rate are not statistically 
Table 6. Cointegration estimates for the EA4 sample
All sectors Manufacturing Services
All countries
rc,t –0.41 (0.11) –0.62 (0.05) –0.46 (0.25)
log(neerc,t) –0.22 (0.00) –0.28 (0.00) –0.33 (0.00)
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
SER 0.06 0.06 0.04
group-PP 0.00 0.00 0.02
group-ADF 0.00 0.00 0.00
without Italy
rc,t –0.04 (0.90) –0.07 (0.86) –0.38 (0.39)
log(neerc,t) –0.10 (0.04) –0.21 (0.00) –0.13 (0.07)
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
SER 0.06 0.05 0.03
group-PP 0.00 0.00 0.01
group-ADF 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: p-values of the asymptotic t statistics in brackets; SER is the standard error of the regression; group-
PP is p-value of the 
,N Tt
Z statistics by Pedroni (1999) for the null hypothesis of non-cointegration; group-




Z statistics for the same hypothesis. Dependent variables: log(qi,c,t).
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significant, while those of the nominal effective exchange rate are significant at 
the 5% level (except for the Services sector, where they are only significant at the 
10% level).
5. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to compare two alternative explanations of the pre-
crisis productivity slowdown that affected the southern countries of the euro area. 
The first explanation, based on the neoclassical growth model, posits that the fall 
in productivity was due to capital misallocation effects, determined by a sudden 
fall in the real interest rate, which diverted financial resources to less produc-
tive firms. In other words, this explanation postulates the existence of a positive 
relation between the real interest rate and productivity (or its rate of growth). 
The second explanation is based on the post-Keynesian growth model, where 
Kaldor’s (1966) second law of growth plays a crucial role. According to this 
model, a sustained increase in the rate of currency appreciation, as experienced in 
Italy since the adoption of the euro, compresses exports with negative feedback 
on aggregate demand and hence on productivity, setting off a vicious circle of 
deteriorating competitiveness and deteriorating productivity.
The replication of Cette et al.’s (2016) study on the relation between real inter-
est rate and productivity growth shows that the empirical evidence supporting the 
misallocation effect is relatively fragile, being crucially affected by inclusion of 
Italy in the sample. Moreover, even in the case of Italy, this evidence fades when 
the nominal effective exchange rate enters the picture. We then move to panel 
cointegration estimates of the relation between productivity, the real interest rate, 
and the nominal effective exchange rate on the sample of EA4 countries from 
1988 to 2008. Once the correct econometric techniques are applied, the “misal-
location” effect disappears or changes sign (in some cases indicating a marginally 
significant negative impact of the interest rate on productivity), while the “post-
Keynesian” effect (i.e. the negative impact of nominal effective exchange rate 
appreciation on productivity) is robust to specification changes, and in particular 
to the exclusion of Italy from the sample.
Of course, there is still a long way to go before definite conclusions can be 
reached. Firstly, formal causality tests should be applied because the negative 
relation between nominal exchange rates and productivity could depend on both 
the demand-side explanation based on Kaldor’s second law of growth (a fall in 
the rate of change of nominal exchange rates stimulates the rate of growth of ex-
ports and hence of productivity via the growth of aggregate demand), as well as 
on a supply-side explanation (an exogenous improvement in productivity due to 
EXPLAINING THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN 131
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
technical progress brings about a fall in unit labour costs and hence a fall in the 
real exchange rate, thereby stimulating exports and growth). Secondly, the model 
should be tested on an extended dataset (for instance, including the whole euro 
area), and its robustness to different measures of the cost of capital, as well as to 
other control variables, should be explored. For instance, it could be interesting 
to check whether controlling for the index of employment protection affects the 
results (as would be expected from Gordon – Dew- Becker 2008).
We leave these challenges for future research, and for the time being take stock 
of the present results in this paper by advancing a provisional conclusion: as far 
as the productivity slowdown in southern euro area countries is concerned, it is 
safe to state that our results do not disprove the prediction of the post-Keynesian 
growth model: the divergence between the productivities of northern and south-
ern countries is explained by a persistent shock in the rate of change of the nomi-
nal exchange rate, determined by the adoption of the single currency.
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APPENDIX A: THE POST-KEYNESIAN GROWTH MODEL
Following Thirlwall (2002), the structural form of the post-Keynesian growth 
model consists of the following four equations:
 
where a dot over a variable indicates its rate of change, and Greek letters are 
parameters. The first equation is the Hicks (1950) supermultiplier, relating the 
rate of growth of real output, yt, to the rate of growth of real exports, xt. The sec-
ond equation is a standard export function, where pdt are domestic prices, et the 
nominal exchange rate (measured as foreign price of domestic currency), and pft 
foreign prices. The third equation is a mark-up pricing relation, where wt is the 
nominal wage, qt average labour productivity, and τt the mark-up. Finally, the 
fourth equation is Verdoorn’s (1949) law, relating the rate of change of productiv-
ity to the rate of change of aggregate demand.
The reduced form of the rate of change of productivity is easily derived:
  
and its derivative with respect to the rate of change of nominal exchange rate is:
  
provided that γηλ>−1, a reasonable hypothesis given the usual estimates of the 
relevant parameters (remember that elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate, 
η, is negative). As a consequence, a permanent increase in ė t, i.e. an increase in 
the rate of nominal revaluation, brings about a permanent decrease in q̇t.
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APPENDIX B: CALCULATING THE TOTAL MULTIPLIER 
OF AN AD MODEL




where the “total effect” (technically speaking, the total multiplier) is the sum of 
the infinite distributed lag θ(L) defined by:
 
The total multiplier of Equation (1) can therefore be obtained by setting L = 1 
in the above distributed lag, as follows:
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